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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates that welfare-improving Customs Unions can be guaranteed even if we 
are constrained by specific non-economic government objectives, thus proving the Cooper- 
Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati conjecture. We consider a 'production' objective here, where a member 
country requires the output of a particular sector (e.g. a target level of industrialization) to be 
maintained atthe pre-union level, and show that welfare-improving Customs Unions can still be 
achieved. It is straightforward to show that this result can be extended to other non-economic 
objectives as well. (~') 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
Kevwords." Customs unions; Non-economic objectives; Kemp-Wan theorem; Trade diversion 
JEL classification." F02; F10; Fl5 
1. Introduction 
The conventional 'static,' benign government' theory of Customs Unions was pio- 
neered by Jacob Viner's (1950) pathbreaking work. I He essentially argued, counter- 
intuitively to those who thought hat even preferential tariff cuts would necessarily be 
welfare-improving, that a subset of countries reducing tariffs on one another to zero would 
not necessarily be improving their own, or world welfare. In short, such Free Trade Areas 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: (401) 863 2170; fax: (401) 863 1970; e-mail: pravin_krishna@brown.edu 
~The Viner approach is 'static' because it concerns only the welfare effects of a once-for-all FTA or CU 
formation instead of considering "time-path' questions. It is a 'benign-government' approach because the 
formation of the FTA or CU is exogenously specified and the incentives to form them so that they are 
endogenously determined (as in Krishna (1993)) are not modeled. See Bhagwati (1993) for these analytical 
distinctions. 
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or Customs Unions (with common external tariffs) could be trade-diverting and harmful or 
trade-creating and beneficial. 
Although there have been numerous important developments within this analytical 
framework, including by Lipsey (1957), Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), Johnson (1962) and 
Meade (1955), interesting developments in new directions have been made in two other 
contributions: 
1. Bhagwati and Brecher (1980) have considered a rather different ype of problem: if a 
Customs Union with internal factor mobility and a common external tariff is already in 
place, how would parametric and policy changes (e.g. factor accumulation and tariff 
change, respectively) affect the welfare of individual members countries? This 
question is clearly of analytical importance for the European Union and indeed for a 
federal state like the United States, if the regional welfare effects of such changes are 
at issue. 
2. Kemp et al. (1976) who have remained more properly within the Viner-Lipsey type of 
question, however, have restored the original intuition that any subset of countries could 
improve their welfare, while not lowering that of others by forming an appropriate 
Customs Union. 2 
There is an interesting conjecture attributable to Cooper and Massell (1965),Johnson 
(1965) and Bhagwati (1968) that state that: 
Any subset of countries can always form a welfare-enhancing Customs Union, while 
ensuring that they still achieve the degree of industrialization that they had achieved 
through protective tariffs 3 
In this short note, we prove the proposition. In doing so, we re-prove the Kemp-Wan 
proposition by using an optimization framework and then readily extend it, by adapting the 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) analysis of non-economic objectives or constraints, to the 
problem at hand. 
2. The Kemp-Wan theorem 
As in Kemp et al. (1976), consider a competitive world trading system with any number 
of countries and with no restrictions whatever on the initial tariffs of individual countries. 
Let any subset of countries form a Customs Union. To see how aggregate gains for the 
member countries can be achieved, we use the familiar Samuelson (1956) social 
indifference curves, which enable us to write a well-behaved social utility function. 
2In doing so, they solved for the common external tariff, therefore using it as an endogenously-determined 
policy variable, unlike in the Viner-Lipsey approach. 
3For instance, Cooper and Massell (1965) ask, "Why should a country be willing to give up its sheltered 
industries for the partial benefits of a Customs Union?" and "Is there a tariff that would make both countries (in 
a CU) better off relative to optimal policies of non preferential t riff protection?" and Bhagwati (1968) states 
that "If LDCs could be allowed to reduce tariff barriers among themselves, this could permit he given trade 
diversion (implicit in each LDC's decision to industrialize) tobe carried out at a lower cost". 
P. Krishna, J. Bhagwati/Japan and the World Economy 9 (1997) 441-446 443 
We allow for the use of lump sum transfers between individuals in the member countries .4
This allows us to neglect distributional issues between the member countries and to 
assert hat, as we move up to higher social indifference curves, Pareto-superior utcomes 
can be achieved. The formulation of the problem closely parallels that of Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan (1969). Let i = 1...n, index goods and j=  1...m, index member 
countries. 
Let the net import vector of the member countries from the rest of the world be denoted 
as 
/=  (/1...I.). 
where, li would be positive if the ith good was a net import from the rest of the 
world and negative if it was a net export. Using the Kemp-Wan strategy, we freeze the 
net import vector of the union at the pre-union level and maximize the social utility 
function, 
U = U(G. . .C . )  (1) 
subject o: 
Ci = EjX~(L~,K~) + li Vi  (2) 
~iL~ = L j V j  (3) 
~iK~ = Kj V j  (4) 
li = l F V i (5) 
where Ci stands for the aggregate availability of good i in the union, X~ stands for 
production in country j of good i using a factor combination of L~ andK~, respectively. L j 
and K 3 denote the total availability of these factors in countryj. Although we only choose 
two factors of production, it will become clear that the results generalize to any number of 
factors. Note that the vector, I F = I = (11 ...In), is the pre-union et import vector and is 
fixed throughout the analysis. The maximization problem above simply recasts the Kemp 
et al. (1976) problem 5 in welfare maximization terms. We can normalize the pre-union 
foreign prices of all goods to unity. It is important to note that we are not assuming a fixed 
foreign price vector. Since, as in Kemp et al. (1976), we freeze the net import vector at the 
pre-union level, trade at the same foreign prices will obtain after the union is formed and 
the welfare of the rest of the world is not reduced. Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are the resource 
constraints. Eq. (5) fixes imports at the pre-union level. 
4Lump sum transfers to ensure Pareto superior outcomes are also used in the original Kemp-Wan framework. 
For an illuminating discussion of how such compensation schemes can be constructed, see Grinols (1981). 
5Kemp et al. (1976) are not explicit about their need for a complete indexation of goods and factor 
endowments bytheir location. However, on closer examination, it is clear that their proof fixes the trade vector 
of each country to arrive at a welfare-improving customs union. The framework that is used in this paper elaxes 
the Kemp-Wan import constraint by only requiring that the pre-union et import vector be fixed for the union as 
a whole. By allowing for further substitution i production and consumption within the union, we can therefore 
achieve even greater levels of welfare than are possible under the corresponding Kemp--Wan construction. 
444 P. Krishna, J. Bhagwati/ Japan and the World Economy 9 (1997) 441-446 
To solve this problem, we now form the Lagrangean: 
- ( jxi(c,, + I , ] )  - - c J ] )  
-- (Zjpj[Y]~iK ~ -- KJ]) -- (Y]i,]i(li -- I F) 
Maximization of the Lagrangean subject to the import vector constraint yields the 
necessary conditions for a constrained optimum. These are: 
Ui = A i V i (6) 
Ai = ~i V i (7) 
AiXjl = wjorL~ = 0 V i , j  (8) 
AiX~2 = pj or K~ = 0 V i , j  (9) 
Eq. (6) along with Eqs. (8) and (9) implies that for an interior solution, the marginal 
rate of substitution between any two goods, say good 1 and good 2, in consumption as 
well as production is the same value, )~1/..~2. Also, from Eq. (6), we know that Ai > 0, Vi. 
We could conveniently choose AI = 1. Finally, from Eq. (7), we then know that, 
1 = VI 
implying that 
Ai/AI  = ~i Vi 
that is, that the marginal rate of substitution in consumption as well as production 
is different from the foreign price ratio. For instance, the marginal rate of substitution 
in consumption as well as production between goods i and 1 is Ai/AI  = rli, whereas 
the foreign price ratio is simply 1 (by construction). This implies a tariff imposed 
against the rest of the world on imports of good i. Note that at an optimum all 
other first-order conditions are to be met. In other words, given the import constraint, he 
second-best optimum is obtained by the use of suitable tariffs on imports from the rest of 
the world and with all other Paretian conditions being met. Since the optimal way to 
achieve the net import vector 'I F' is as is described above, we can obviously conclude 
that any other way of achieving 'I F' can be (weakly) improved upon. Since 'I' was 
actually achieved before the union, the pre-union situation can be (weakly) improved 
upon by the removal of all intra-union tariffs and by the use of a common external tariff 
(as is implied by the solution to the maximization problem above). This is simply the 
Kemp et al. (1976) result. 6
6The original proof of the theorem considers a fictitious economy composed of member countries but with a 
net endowment equal to the sum of the member countries' endowment plus the equilibrium preunion et excess 
supply of the rest of the world. The economy then possesses an optimum and any optimum can be supported by 
at least one internal price vector. If the pre-union equilibrium of the member countries is a Pareto-optimal 
equilibrium of the fictitious economy or it is not; in the latter case, a preferred Pareto-optimal equilibrium can be 
attained by means of lump sum transfers among individuals of the fictitious economy. It must also be mentioned 
that the framework used in this paper is less general than the Kemp-Wan framework which, inter alia, allows for 
heterogenous preferences across consumers and for transport cost considerations. 
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2.1. The Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati conjecture 
We now take a non-economic production objective into account. Thus, for instance, let 
us assume that each countryj within the union wants the level of its production of good i to 
be maintained at the pre-union level. This would imply additional constraints in the 
maximization exercise of the type, 
X~ : X~ ~ Vj (lO) 
whereX~ is the pre-union level of production of good i in country J. 
The inclusion of this additional constraint alters the first-order conditions corresponding 
to L~ and K~. The new first-order conditions are. 
(A/q- ~)X~I : a)j Vj (8a) 
and 
(Ai + ~)X~2 = pj Vj. (9a) 
From Eqs. (8a) and (9a), the marginal rates of substitution in production between good 
i and all the other goods are different from the corresponding marginal rates of substitu- 
tion in consumption between good i and the other goods, implying that a production tax- 
cum-subsidy policy in each country is optimal. Also, from Eq. (8a) and Eq. (9a), the 
marginal rate of substitution between L and K is the same in the production of the good i as 
it is in the production of all other goods. Thus, there is no factor subsidy involved (except in 
the trivial sense of an equi-proportionate subsidy on L and K used in the production of good 
i, which, after all, is equivalent to a production subsidy on good i). Importantly, all other 
Paretian conditions hould still be met for a constrained optimum,, implying that the intra- 
union tariffs should be kept at zero. Any other way of achieving X~ = X~ ~ can be (weakly) 
improved upon. Since X~ = X~ ~ was actually achieved before the union, the pre-union 
situation can be (weakly) improved upon and a (weakly) Pareto-superior utcome can be 
achieved. 
Equally, it follows that the feasible welfare level of this union would be even greater if 
the constraint X~ = X~ ~ Vj was weakened and rewritten as 
: ~]~jX i , 
so that the constraint is only an aggregate union-wide constraint (as originally in Cooper 
and Massell (1965)). 
This result can also be readily extended to other 'non-economic' onstraints. A welfare- 
enhancing Customs Union which does not harm or benefit non-members can be formed 
even if each member equires, for instance, that its manufacturing employment not fall. 
The 'supporting policy,' complementing the common external tariff, then will be an 
employment-tax-cum subsidy (exactly as in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969)). 
3. Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that welfare-improving Customs Unions can be guaranteed 
even if we are constrained by specific non-economic government objectives. We have 
considered a 'production' objective here, but it is straightforward to show that this result 
can be extended to other non-economic objectives as well. As we would expect from the 
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insights of both the Kemp-Wan theorem and the theory of non-economic objectives, the 
necessarily welfare improving Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati union requires both an 
appropriate common tariff and an appropriate domestic tax-cum- subsidy addressed tothe 
non-economic objective desired. 
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Note added in proof 
Using a technique very similar to the one adopted in this paper and following the unified 
intuition regarding second best problems developed in Krishna and Panagariya (1996) - 
that removal of some pre-existing distortions, if all remaining distortions are quantitative 
ones, is always (weakly) welfare improving, Krishna and Panagariya (1997) show that we 
can also always construct necessarily welfare improving free trade areas (in contrast to the 
necessarily welfare improving customs unions that he Kemp-Wan theorem delivers instead). 
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